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THE NATURE OF THE NATION·STATE SYSTEM
David D. Warren
Today international society consists
of something like 120 units that we call
states. The United Nations, with a roster
expected to reach no in the Seventeenth General Assembly, is approaching universality; only a few nonmembers
remain outside, such as divided Germany, Korea, and neutral Switzerland.
This represents a marked increase in the
size of the nation-state system over the
past 20 years, largely owing to the
liquidation of European-held empires
and the emergence of so many countries
in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Yet
despite this growth, the international
community remains an exclusive club.
Each member-state has certain characteristics entitling it to admission-a defined territory, a permanent population,
the capacity to enter into relations with
other states, and most important of all,
sovereignty. For every state is the supreme law-maker and law-enforcer
within its defined territory, recognizing
no external authority as superior to
itself. It is this characteristic especially
which has so much to do with determining the nature of the state system, as
we shall explain below.
Now while there is a natural tendency for man to regard the territorial
state as the center of his universe, and
to attribute to its permanence and
durability in the scheme of things, we
should not overlook the fact that other
political units have served man in the

past, disappearing from the scene as
they have failed to fulfill his needs. Nor
have all of these been identified with
territory as is the modern state. Men in
earliest times came together and organized their lives on the basis of
kinship in the family, clan, or tribe. And
in the evolution of Western civilization,
the present territorial state was preceded by the extreme political fragmentation called feudalism, and before that
by the empire and the city-state. All of
these political units-the clan, the tribe,
the city-state, the empire, the duchy
and fiefdom, the modern territorial
state-are alike in the fundamental
objectives they have sought: (1) sect rity
and (2) prosperity. The preamble of the
Constitution, for example, lists the provision of the common defense and
promotion of the general welfare among
the paramount concerns of the United
States. As the course of history shows,
failure to realize the aims of security
and prosperity by any political unit has
been responsible ultimately for its
downfall. Also to be found in these
political units, including the territorial
state, are the same bedrock causes of
conflict, both economic and politicalthe desire for food and resources unevenly distributed, and the drive for
aggrandizement. Moreover, major
changes have generally occurred through
the use of force, the application of
overwhelming power.

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

150
It will be instructive to examine
briefly the world of the Greek city-state
because, in microcosm, that world so
much resembles our own. Like the
nation-state system, the city-state system was pluralistic, made up of a
number of units varying in size and
strength but autonomous, subjected to
no outside authority. Physical propinquity, different resource patterns, and
economic needs, made for interdependence of the city-states. Some of
them as maritime communities met the
pressure of population upon a limited
resource base by engaging in colonial
enterprises, establishing settlements, and
gaining access to food and raw materials
away from home. Others sought security and welfare by imposing their
control over adjacent states or peoples
through a superior show of force. Thus
the Greek city-states, too, practiced
imperialism. That same mechanism, the
balance of power, operated again and
again to frustrate the ambitions of
empire entertained by the larger citystates-Athens, Sparta, Thebes or
Corinth. The hegemony established by
any of these over the others was shortlived, galvanizing them into unified
action against the source of danger.
Leagues or alliances came into being
only to disintegrate after the common
threat was ended or because of internal
discord. Intrasystem rivalries were forgotten when the Greek city-states
banded together against the common
enemy, imperial Persia, in the 5th century.
Yet the city-state ceased to be a
viable political unit; it could no longer
provide, singly, for the requisite security
and prosperity of its people. It was too
small; some kind of effective and lasting
union was needed if the city-state was
to survive. The inability, however, of
the city-states to create a wider union
led to their absorption by Philip and
Alexander. The city-state, in short,
foundered on the rock of something
resembling modern nationalism-the

commitment of the people of individual
city-states to their own way of life, their
inahility to rise above their narrow
parochialism.
If pluralism was the central characteristic of the Greek city-state system,
unity became the order of the day
under the Roman Empire, a unity which
eventually embraced all of the Mediterranean world. Through conquests, the
Roman domain expanded; political
genius was responsible for its longevity.
Bringing with them law and peace,
extending citizenship to subject peoples,
the Romans carried through a program
of gradual assimilation. They accepted
many practices and institutions where
they went. They built a lasting empire
on the solid footing of consent. So large
did these holdings become, however,
that it grew increasingly difficult to
maintain effective control from a single
center. Countermeasures developed in
both the North and the East, economic
disintegration sapped the empire's
strength, and internal clashes weakened
the fabric of imperial society. Rome, no
longer able to supply security and welfare, collapsed.
Still, the appeal of unity, though
gone, exerted an attraction over the
minds of men in the ensuing centuries.
For once again pluralism characterized
the political order. Briefly, it is true.
Charlemagne dominated Western
Europe. And in return for Charlemagne's military support, Pope Leo III
revived the imperial idea, making
Charlemagne the Emperor of the
Romans in 800 A.D. The empire lasted
only a short while, returning again,
however, when Otto the Great was
crowned Holy Roman Emperor in the
10th century. Thereafter the title was
associated with one of the Germanic
rulers. But the facts did violence to the
pretensions of empire. At most, that
empire was confined to a group of
German principalities; beyond these, it
exercised no real authority. In Europe
there existed real political decentraliza-
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tion, a multiplicity of duchies, fiefdoms,
and principalities enjoying a large measure of autonomy, over which wider
kingdoms had only a nominal control.
Whatever limited unity there was grew
out of a common religion centered in
Rome and fostered by a joint effort of
the various crusades against the Eastern
infidel from the late 11th century beyond the middle of the 13th century.
Great forces at work in the 14th and
15th centuries, however, undermined
the institutions associated with the
Middle Ages and led to the formation of
a new political unit, the territorial state.
Contributing to this outcome was the
growth of trade and urban centers
accompanied by the rise of a new
commercial class; the alliance between
this class and the ruler, prince or king,
bent on imposing order by force upon a
congeries of petty principalities often at
war with each other; and the schism
within the Roman Church eventuating
in the Reformation, the spread of
Protestant sects, and an end to religious
unity in Europe.
The territorial state, representing a
centralization of political power where
before there had been diffusion, was
early associated with the personal ruler
or dynasty who had brought this about.
Starting in a small cluster of Western
European states-England, France,
Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands-the
new political unit has spread, attaining
worldwide coverage over the past four
and a half centuries. Situated as they
were on the Atlantic, these first territorial states were in a position to convey
their greater power via the ocean highways, and to impose that power upon
the weaker societies found on the great
frontier opened up by exploration in
the Americas, Africa and Asia. The
European overlords brought with them
not only their superior technology and
administrative techniques; they also introduced their methods of political organization. The subordinated groups
gradually adopted the same claims made

by their rulers-the right to control their
own affairs without interference. For
there is a fundamental conflict between
the assertion of sovereignty by the
territorial state, involving in essence the
rejection of any external authority, and
the practice of imperialism, which
means the extension of one state's
control over another people and thus
the denial of the latter's right to sovereignty.
The striking contrast between conditions within the territorial state and
those obtaining outside in the growing
community of states, lies in the order of
the one as against the chaos of the
other. That is, while sovereignty
brought peace, regularity, and stability
to the territorial state, the refusal of the
state to recognize any authority above
itself made for anarchy and conflict in
the relations between states entertaining
identical views about their sovereign
rights. The great achievement of the
territorial state internally has been its
ability to bring about peaceful change,
adjusting conflicts through a highly
developed machinery of government. In
international society, by contrast, that
machinery is rudimentary, operating
with nothing like the efficiency it has in
domestic society.
The absence of a supranational lawmaking, law-interpreting and lawenforcing authority armed with a
monopoly of force compels each state
to rely on its own efforts in order to
preserve its identity and to realize those
aims which it considers vital. As a
consequence every state is obsessed with
maximizing the power, human and material, available to it in order to increase
its security.
But power is always relative, involving a relationship between one person,
group, or political unit and another.
Thus one nation's increase in power is
bound to be viewed as a threat by one
or some neighboring states. Politics
everywhere involve a struggle among
competing groups for power, for control
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by one or more groups, over the behavior of the other. That competition in
turn is the inevitable outgrowth of the
divergent-and unlimited-wants and
needs impelling group organization and
activity. The nation-state is simply the
largest, most cohesive, and demanding
of the many groups to which men
belong. But just because peace-making
and peace-keeping processes do not
function nearly so effectively as they do
within the territorial state, interstate
relations come closest to resembling a
naked struggle for power. Politics, while
necessarily involving conflict among
groups, also requires some measure at
least of cooperation. In the international arena, obviously, elements of
conflict far outweigh elements of cooperation. The great dilemma for the
nation-state system has always been,
and still remains, how to bring about
peaceful change in a world whose only
certainty is change, thereby making
impossible any and all attempts to fix a
given status quo permanently. In sum
then, given an environment of international anarchy, the constant striving for
security by each state only serves to
intensify the storms of insecurity by
which the world of nation-states is
buffeted.
Reflecting these conditions, states
have employed war as a means to
further their important objectives. The
very acceptance of the legality of war
well into the 20th century was proof of
the reliance on self-help and, ultimately,
violence by states in resolving disputes.
Not for nothing has war been termed
the "endemic disease" of the nationstate system. The history of that system
could almost be described as one of
chronic warfare punctuated by brief
respites of peace. This is not to say that
the character of war has remained the
same. Before the territorial state system
had fully evolved, war became total as
Europe was convulsed in the 16th and
early 17th centuries by religious controversy. At last the Treaty of Westphalia

in 1648, accepting a pluralistic community of territorial states and the
principle of religious toleration, ushered
in a new age. During the next two
centuries wars still occurred but they
were, compared to the earlier religious
conflicts, limited in their aims and
prosecution, dynastic rivalries for the
most part fought for modest stakes by
practitioners schooled in the rules of the
game.
All this was to change, however, after
1900 in what the French writer, Raymond Aron, has aptly called "The Century of Total War." Once more, and far
more completely, war took on a total
aspect, pervading every level of society,
making immoderate demands upon its
participants and seeking total, not
limited goals. But owing to the introduction of a new factor it may well be
that there shall never again be a total
war. That new factor is, of course, the
technological revolution in weapons
achieved through the invention of
thermonuclear bombs. It has profoundly altered the nature of war, precluding resort to the big war between
wielders of this awesome power. If
man's actions were always guided by
rational motives, this belief in the elimination of total war might be soundly
based. There is little in the record of
man's behavior, unfortunately, to
justify such confidence in his rationality. The big war which nobody wants,
arising simply from human miscalculation, excessive ambitions, or sheer madness, cannot be ruled out. And even if it
could, war would still have to be reckoned with as a very real possibility in its
limited forms, both conventional and
unconventional. In fact, the very unsuitability of total war in the modern
world puts renewed stress upon adequate preparations for limited war in all
its varieties.
An extremely influential force
moulding the nation-state system and
not to be ignored in any critique of this
system is, of course, nationalism. Every
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political unit in history has drawn
strength from an emotion analogous to
that of modern nationalism. For no
political unit will endure for long unless
it is able to arouse and maintain among
its members a sense of loyalty and
devotion. Now modern nationalism is
distinguished from manifestations of
pride in being associated with a tribe,
city-state or-empire, by its greater intensity and the extent to which it reaches
and moves nearly all members of the
nation-state. The rulers responsible for
centralizing political power in the first
territorial states won the active allegiance of only a portion of their subjects.
The transition from the dynasty to the
nation-state, starting with France in the
late 18th century and thereafter gaining
rapid momentum elsewhere, was
marked by the identification of the
masses, the people themselves, with the
interests of the state under which they
lived. They and their energies were
enlisted in the causes of the state: they
suffered and gloried in its defeats and
accomplishments. A widely held expectation in the 19th century was that once
the different peoples sharing this sense
of identity, of common purpose, had
satisfied their desire to run their own
affairs, conflicts among national groups
subsisting under their own governments
would evaporate. But the triumph of
nationalism almost everywhere has had
no such result. In actuality nationalism
has only abetted the drive for power
and influence among the nation-states.
It has magnified that sense of superiority over other groups which lies at its
core. It has distorted the attitude of
national groups in their relations with
each other and justified any course of
action that a people wish to pursue,
however partisan and self-seeking their
real motives might be.
A central question which must be
asked about the nation-state is whether
it has been able to meet the demands
upon it, as upon all political units, for
security and prosperity. For, after all, it

was the search for these prime goals and
the failure of the preexisting system to
provide them that led to the birth of the
territorial state. The purpose of centralizing political power and of establishing
the ruler's supreme authority was to
achieve more security. And in this regard, the territorial state had some
success. By augmenting its own power
and refusing to acknowledge any higher
authority, the state originally did bring
security to its own defined territory and
inhabitants. In effect, its territory became impermeable. Even in the economic realm everything was done to
further the exclusiveness of the state.
Dependence was undesirable, so each
state in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries strove for self-sufficiency, an excess
of exports over imports in trade and the
accumulation of gold holdings. The
colonial acquisitions of this imperial
epoch were sought because they furnished supplies of raw materials required by the mother country and
absorbed surplus products available
from it. Thus the state, in both the
political and economic spheres, followed a policy of exclusiveness.
But certain fundamental forces
worked gradually to defeat this policy
of exclusiveness. Under the impact of
the industrial and communications revolutions, states became interdependent,
their self-sufficiency destroyed by the
vastly increased production and circulation of goods, greater specialization, and
higher standards of living. The maintenance of prosperity within the state
became hostage to economic movements over which the state could exercise little control. A single international
economy had come into being; no state
was immune from the influences
exerted by that economy, and prosperity was indivisible. Nor has the state
been able to insure the security of those
under its jurisdiction. Thermonuclear
weapons combined with accurate delivery systems have shattered the state's
impenetrability. Territorial demarca-
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tions and defensive measures afford no
effective barriers against attack; the
state no longer is invulnerable.
For these reasons, many observers of
the international scene argue that the
nation·state, like the political units that
preceded it, is in decline, headed for
inevitable demise. Left to its own resources, the state just does not have the
capacity to produce the requisite security and welfare. Some wider political
unit, it is argued, is called for in the face
of such great changes. Yet, despite these
syndromes of a fatal disease, it is one of
those extraordinary paradoxes that the
nation-state system at the same time
exhibits great vitality, as its rapidly
growing membership attests. Nationalism would still appear to be the most
powerful current in international
society, responsible for the emergence
of more than forty nation-states in the
past two decades alone. To the peoples
of these newly independent countries,
there is no higher value than their
hard-won sovereignty. In the older
nation-states, it is ture, extreme nationalism has lost some of its appeal as a
result of bitter experience, prompting
some of them to move beyond the
exclusive national grouping into a wider
society, as in the European Coal and
Steel Community and the European
Economic Community. But no one
would claim, even within these European states, that nationalism has ceased
to be a potent force.
How has the nation-state system
been able to endure for so long if the
foregoing description of anarchy,
chronic instability, and collective insecurity is accurate? The answer can be
found in the operation of the balance of
power. With all of its shortcomings, no
other mechanism has functioned so well
in restraining the unbridled quest for
power by nation-states. As in the Greek
city-state world so in the nation-state
community, would-be dominators of
that community have met determinedand combined-resistance from those

states imperiled by hegemonial ambitions. And all thrusts for extensive
power over neighboring countries have
eventually been frustrated by that
massing of counterpower which is the
essence of the balancing machinery.
Whether it was a Philip ll, Louis XlV,
Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Hitler or
Stalin, each met failure in reaching his
goal.
The attitude of the United States
toward the balance of power has altered
to fit its role in world affairs. During
our long isolation from international
politics, made possible by geographical
factors and a European-maintained
equilibrium, the American view was one
of suspicion and distaste for the balance
of power, as if it were not an inevitable
corollary of the nation-state system.
Even involvement in World War I did
not change that view. According to
President Wilson, his voluntary association of states, representing a concert of
organized power, would do away with
entangling alliances and competition for
power. It took World War II and its
aftermath, however, to convince the
United States that there was no alternative to participating in the balancing
process. The Soviet Union by its blatant
attempt to change the postwar distribution of power in its favor, forced the
United States to employ its considerable
strength as a counterweight. Reduction
in the number of truly major powers to
two has in no sense destroyed the
balancing machinery. Wherever there are
two or more autonomous forces, the
balancing operation will take place. Admittedly the balance of power worked
best when there were six or eight states
of roughly equal strength, with no single
one strong enough to dominate the
others and uncertainty as to what the
alliance groupings might be. But today
the greater inflexibility implicit in a
direct confrontation of two superpowers is offset by the "balance of
terror," the inability in the interests of
survival for either great power to resort
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to total war. To meet the Soviet challenge to the balance of power, the
United States has used traditional devices, constructing an intricate complex
of alliances and a great military establishment It would appear then that as
long as the nation-state system survives,
knowledge of the balance of power and
skill in making it function are essential.
Thus far we have discussed divisions
in in ternational society. Are there cohesive forces present, binding the states
of that society together? As already
mentioned, a world community has
developed gradually over the past
several centuries, and markedly so since
1900. It is commonplace today to say
that the world has been made one,
brought together by the scientific, technological, and industrial revolutions.
But thc degt;ee of political integration
achieved has heen comparatively small.
This is not to say that progress in the
evolution of a more closely knit society
has not occurred. It has been outpaced,
however, by the high degree of integration so typical of the national society,
overshadowing and even threatening the
very real gains made in the international
community.
One has only to consider, for example, the various organs of the United
Nations. The Security Council has been
given primary responsibility for maintaining peace. But it has not been able
to discharge this function when the
superpowers, the United States and the
Soviet Union, have been at loggerheads.
It has no preponderant force to bring to
bear in the absence of agreement between the superpowers and can be
paralyzed by use of the veto. Still, we
should not forget that permanent peacekeeping machinery has been an invention of quite recent origin. And the
same thing can be said about the General Assembly with its quasi-legislative
powers as well as the judicial agency,
the International Court of Justice_
Neither of these are effective governmental organs in the same sense that

legislative and judicial bodies are within
the national society. Nor does the Secretariat of the United Nations have anything like the power of the executive
branch in the nation-state. Nevertheless,
rudimentary though these institutions
may be, however restricted their
strength, they have demonstrated their
value in the handling of many international conflicts. Moreover, there is the
hope that out of the experience
acquired in operating these international
organs, they will be endowed over time
by their creators, the nation-states, with
increasing power and responsibilities.
After all, though the nation-state system
is more than 450 years old, only in the
past fifty years have there been any
experiments in building permanent
international government. It is far too
early to dismiss these experiments in
limiting the struggle for power as ineffectual. Until recently men were primarily concerned with devoting their
full energies to their own nation-states;
creation of a more stahle international
order tended to be neglected.
Today, the necessity for such an
order is more pressing. Some see in the
universal fear of annihilation an irresistible impetus driving men to erect a
supranational government capable of
regulating relations between states. This
I regard as too sanguine a view. Men
often do not act in their own best
interests; men and nations cannot be
presumed to be so rational that because
destruction confronts them they will
avoid it. Besides, the pull of nationalism
remains so strong that any world government, no matter how compelling or
logical the need for it may be, seems a
long way off. Those essential elements
of consensus upon which a lasting community is built just do not exist.
There are also many who believe that
the way to world peace is through the
development of world law. But if Professor Quincy Wright's analysis of the
evolution of political society is correct,
this is to put the cart before the horse.
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Arguing by analogy to the domestic
order, Professor Wright brings out that
the first step, preliminary to the later
growth of effective law, the legislative
process, and administrative organs, is
the bringing of peace to the society in
question. Generally such peace has been
imposed by overwhelming power. In the
larger framework of international
society, is any state capable of dominating the globe? Not even a superpower, the United States or Russia,
seems likely to have that capacity or at
least the ability to maintain the peace
once established. Despite the instruments of control now available to a
universal imperial power, the world is
too large, too diversified to be ruled
from any single center for long. The
Soviet Union, bent on carrying through
its design for world state, has run into
serious difficulties already trying to
dominate the narrow sphere of Eastern
Europe. Moreover, its role as undisputed
interpreter of Marxist doctrine has come
under sharp attack within a communist
camp torn by centrifugal tendencies. As
for the United States, its democratic
ideology, its commitment to the selfdetermination of peoples peculiarly unfits it for the task of world empirebuilding.
A review, such as we have made here,
of the characteristics of the nation-state
system might easily arouse gloom about
its prospects. One is almost prompted to
say, as does the title of an English
musical play, "Stop the world, I want to
get off." For international society does
not appear headed toward any imminent and fundamental change. This
means then that so long as there is a
pluralistic society composed of sovereign units, there will be wide divergencies of interests and deep-rooted con-

flicts whose resolutions will not be
easily found. Some broader political
unit than the individual nation-state
seems essential if men are to find the
security and prosperity they seek. The
creation of such a political unit or units
would not represent a radical departure
from the existing state-system. Moreover, there is a device at hand which
might be used, a device particularly
familiar to Americans and one which
they have put to work with remarkable
results in their own country. This is, of
course, federalism, the creation of a
central government of limited powers to
reap the advantages of unity and, at the
same time, retention of the political
identity of the component states in
order to preserve a desirable diversity.
Transferred to the international scene,
federalism could be adopted by those
states of, let us say, the Atlantic Community, building upon shared values,
beliefs and experience. The foundation
stones for an edifice of federalism already exist in such notable advances as
the European Economic Community,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development. It would
be foolish to minimize the obstacles in
building this federal system. Such a
venture calls for unusual vision, initiative and political genius, qualities always
in scarce supply. What is more, time is
running out. There are two further
alternatives, but one seems impractical
and the second grim. As we have
pointed out before, creation of a world
government is unlikely. On the other
hand, continuation of the nation-state
society along its present highly differentiated course impels us to move beyond
the national community toward federation-and soon.
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